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THE SUPREME COURT'S THEORY OF A DIRECT TAX.

T

HE decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Pollock
ease1 of I895 was the beginning of an attempt on the part
of the court to formulate a new definition of a direct tax,
and since that time in every case which has called for a decision as
to whether a particular tax was a direct tax the court has reverted
to and tried to harmonize its decision with the reasoning set forth
in the Pollock case. This decision overturned a fairly definite and
universally accepted definition of a direct tax which had existed
for nearly a century. In order to understand the new view in contrast with the old we find it necessary to. review briefly the earlier
period.
With the one exception of a tax on exports the constitutional
grant of power to Congress to levy taxes is plenary, subject to two
regulations :
( r) "* * * all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States."2
(2) "No capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in
proportion to "the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to
be taken." 3 The same idea is expressed in another clause thus :
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states * * * according to their respective numbers." 4
Several investigations have been made of the records of the Constitutional Convention of I7~7 and of the various state ratifying conventions in order to determine what meaniu.g was atta.::lted to the
term "direct tax." 5 It is not necessary here to cover this ground
again but it is sufficient to say tl~at. the authoritative opinion of
those who have examined the records is that there was no definite
meaning agreed upon in the Convention and that it was a vague
term. One writer summarizes the situation thus: "Amid this
diversity of opinion orily one thing is sure, namely, that no one knew
exactly what was meant by ::i. direct tax, because no two people
agreed." 6
~ 157 U. S. 429 and 158 U. S. 601. (1895).
•Article 1, sec. 8, clause l.
•Article l, sec. 9, clause 4.
•Article l, sec. 2, clause 3.
1 Seligman, E. R. A., The Income Tax.
Macmillan; New York, 1914- Bullock,
C. J., Origin, Purpose and Effect of the Dir~ct·Tax Clause· of the Federal Co,;stitution.
Political Science Quarterly, XV, 217, 452. Morrow, D. W., The Income Tax Amendment. Columbia I.aw Review, X, 379.
• Seligman, p. 569.

WHAT IS A DIRECT TAX?

EARLY CASES.
In 1794 Congress levied a tax on carriages "for the convenience
of persons which shall be kept by or for any person for his or her
own use, or to be let out for hire, or for the conveying of passengers." The law was attacked as unconstitutional on the ground
that it enacted a direct tax, which therefore should be apportioned.
The matter came before the Supreme Court in the Hylton case.7
HAMILTON, who argued the case for the Government, said, in part:
"What is the distinction between direct and indirect taxes? It is a
matter of regret that terms so uncertain and vague in so important
a point are to be found in the Constitution. We shall seek in vain
for any antecedent settled legal meaning to the respective termsthere is none." After pointing out the difficulty of applying the
rule of shiftability, or incidence, or of making consciousness of
paying it the test of a direct tax, he urged an interpretation which
would permit the National Government to exercise the powers given
-one of which was clearly the power to levy taxes. "The boundary,
[between direct and indirect taxes] then," he ~rgued, "must be
fixed by a species of arbitration, and ought to be such as will involve neither absurdity nor inconvenience." Then followed HAMILTON'S distinction: "The following are presumed to be the only
direct taxes : capitation or poll taxes ; taxes on lands and buildings ;
general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals,
or on their whote real or personal estate. All else must of necessity
be considered as indirect taxes."
The court accepted HAMILTON'S reasoning and the three judges
who delivered opinions took the stand that only taxes which could
be apportioned should be considered direct taxes. 8 In his opiniol)..
Justice CHASE delivered the following dictum:· "I am inclined to'
think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct
taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to-wit, a
capitation or poll tax, simply without regard to property, profession,
or any other circumstance; and a tax on land. I doubt whether a
tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United
States, is included within the term direct tax:'
Justice PATTERSON said: "Whether direct taxes, in the sense of
the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax,
and tax on land, is a questionable point/'
Justice IREDELL said: " Perhaps a direct tax, in the sense of the
Constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparably
•Hylton v. United States. 3 Dallas 111. Cz796>.
• Justlces Chase, Patterson, and Iredell.
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annexed to th~ soil, something capable of apportionment .under all
such circumstances."
The decision in the Hylton case was that a tax on carriages was
a tax on expense _and therefore an excise and not a direct tax.
In Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule,9·the court held that a tax
on the incomes of insurance companies was an indirect tax. The
difficulty of apportionment was again emphasized in the opinion and
there was a tendency to make the possibility of apportionment the
test of a direct tax. The dicta of the judges in the Hylton case,
that probably capitation taxes and taxes on land are the only direct
taxes within the Constitution, were quoted.
In Veazie Bank v. F enno,1° a· tax on state-bank notes was held to
be not a direct tax. The Hylton case was again relied upon. The court
said: "It may be rightly affirmed, therefore, that in the practical
construction of the Constitution by Congress, direct taxes have been
limited to taxes on land and appurtenances, and taxes on polls, or
capitation taxes."
In Scholey v. Rew,11 the court held that an inheritance tax was
an indirect tax on the ground of its similarity in principle to the
income tax which had already been declared to be constitutional.
Finally an income tax which had been imposed on incjividuals
came up in the case of Springer v. United States. 12 The court said:
"Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the
Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty."13
THE INCOME TAX CASE OF

1895.

The income tax law of 1894 came before the court in the case of
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company 14 and was held unconstitutional. Since there was not a full bench at the first hearing
and there- was an even division of those justices present on some
•7 Wallace 433. (1868)
14 8 Wallace 533. (1869).
u 23 Wallace 331. (1874)•
. .. 102
586. (1880).

u. s.

u In the meantime Congress had levied direct truces under the rule of apportion·
ment in 1798, 1813, 1815, 1816, and s861. The first four were limited to lands, im·
provements, dwellinit houses. and slav"ll. The act of 1861 omitted slaves from the
above list.
Tho leadinQ'.· constitutional authorities such as Chancellor Kent, Justfoe Story,
Cooley, and Justice Mil~~ had acoepted this "speoies, of a~bitration" by Hamilton and
it seemed to be an established rule.
St 157 U. S. 42!1 and 158 U. S. 6o1.
(1Sg5).
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of the questions at issue, a rehearing was granted and a second
opinion given. The opinion in 157 U. S., may be summarized thus:
(I) A tax on income from real estate is a tax on real estate, because
the distinction between that which gives value to property and the
property itself is a forced one. (2) A tax on real estate is a direct
tax. (3) Therefore, a tax on income from real estate is a direct tax.
The results of the second opinion may be stated thus : (I) A
general income tax is a general property tax. ( 2) Where the power
lacks tp tax a source- it lacks to tax the income therefrom. (3)
Power lacks to levy an unapportioned general property tax, therefore it lacks to levy an unapportioned general income tax. The
fallacy in this reasoning lies in the assumption that any tax on property is a direct tax. A tax on income from property may amount
to a tax on property but is it a direct tax ?15 ·
The question with which we are here concerned is whether this
case yields a definition of a direct tax. The court began by giving
the economic definition of a direct tax, that is, shiftability was
made the test, and asserted that to be the true definition, but immediately left this view with the assertion that "we must inquire what
the framers of the Constitution intended the term to mean." In
only one other instance do we find Chief Justice Fur.I.ER alluding,
even in a remote way, to the economic definition; and that was when
he said there was no possible means of escape from payment of the
tax on the part of real property holders. Because of this one vague
reference and the fact that he nowhere attempted to show that this
tax could not be shifted, we feel that the Chief Justice was not sure
of his ground here and, therefore, diG not rely upon this definition
for his decision. We take this view despite the fact that Justice
WHITE, in his dissenting opinion, strongly intim~ted that the court
was construing the word "direct" in its economic sense, instead of
in accordance with its meaning in the Constitution.
Chief Justice 'FULLER made much of the argument that the words
were used in the Constitution in "their natural and obvious import,"
but nowhere did he tell us what that import was, and the-mere assertion gets us nowhere.
The G_hief Justice appeared extremely wary of making a positive
statement which might be construed as some kind of a definition of
:11 The decision may be partly due to the poor handling qi the- case on the part
of the Government. It practically admitted that the tax on incomes from state and
municipal securities was a tax on the source while contending that a tax on rent was
not a true on land but a tax on so much personal property irrespective of its origin.
It asserted that "rents in tho pocket of the owner ar-e not insrinsically and of tltemselv•
1and. They are money, like any other." Thus by the govemmenl'it Q'\Ul rejlfej~atation
the tax was a tax on ~roperty though p~operty in pocket.
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a direct tax. In the opinion we find this question. asked: "Can it
be properly held that the Constitution, taken in its plain and obvious.
sense, and with due regard to the circumstances attending the formation of the government, authorizes a general unapportioned tax on
the products of the farm and the rents of real estate, although imposed merely because of ownership and with no possible means of
escape from payment, as belonging to a totally different class from
that which includes the property from whence the income proceeds ?"16 A few lines later he said the same reasoning should apply
to the income from "capital in personalty."
Later courts have seized upon the phrase used here, "because of
ownership," and interpreted it as an essential part of the opinion.
The income tax, however, does not reach real estate which is not
productive of an income although the element of ownership is the
same as of that which produces an income. The income tax also
reaches incomes which are not from property or incomes which may
be partly from property and partly from other sources. Can it be
said then that the tax was levied merely because of ownership? The
court evidently realized the difficulties and presented the thought
merely in the form of a question. It is hardly a reasonable interpretation to say that the court considered this phrase essential for
arriving at the decision given.
The theory developed in some of the ea.rlier cases of making the
possibility of apportionment the test of a direct tax was thrown
overboard entirely in this case.
Thus the court overthrew the old construction of a "direct tax"
which had held for a hundred years and gave us no comprehensive
definition in its place. It was left to succeeding courts to try tor~ad into this opinion a workable definition.
DEVELOPMENT FROM THE POLLOCK CASE TO THE SIXTEENTH
AMENDMENT.

'The first case after the Income Ta% decision in which the Supreme
Court passed on the constitutionality of a tax was Nicol v. Ames,11
A tax had been levied upon sales at business exchanges. The
court's position here was 'a difficult one. It had now evidently persuaded itself that the principle underlying the Pollock case was that
a tax upon property as such is a direct tax. At the same time it
was confronted by counsel's argument that a tax upon sales is a
tax upon the commodities sold,-a proposition supported hy Brown

u. s.

lS 158
"173 U.

627.628.
(18gg).

S. so11.
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v. Maryland. 18 The logical conclusion, obviously, was to admit that
a tax on sales was a direct tax and this indeed the court impliedly
does do, notwithstanding the fact that a tax on sales had hitherto
always ·been considered an excise. At the same time; however, the
court did not wish to declare this particular tax void. The difficulty was accordingly solved by declaring the tax to be not upon.
the sales but "upon the privilege, opportunity, or facility offered at
boards of trade or exchanges for the transaction of the business
mentioned in the act." "It is not," the court proceeded, "a tax upon
the business itself which' is so transacted, but it is a duty. upon the
facilities made use of and actually employed in the transaction of
the business, and separate and apart from the business itself. * * *
It is not laid upon the property at all, nor upon the profits
of the sale thereof, nor upon the sale itself considered separate and apart from the place and the circumstances of
the sale."10 The ominous possibilities of such a position are.,?.ppar- ·
ent, and they are not lessened .by the court's careful disavowal of
the tax before it as a tax upon business. For even the Pollock case
avoids classifying such taxes as direct. 20
The Federal War Revenue Act of June 13, 1898, imposed a succession tax upon legacies or distributive shares of personalty passing
at death. It came before the Supreme Court in Knowlton v.
1VIoore,2 1 where ·the court encountered a second difficulty arising
from its interpret;ition of the Income Ta% case. Counsel presented
the argument that there are certain inherent rights of ownership;
that to tax these rights was to tax the property owned, and that the
right of transmission was such a right. The court, however, main·
tained that the tax was not upon an inherent right but upon a
privilege, and gave a long historical discussion in support of this
view. 22 Nevertheless, Kno1e•lton v. 111oore, even more clearly than
Nicol v. Ames, interprets the Pollock case as establishing the proposition that a tax upon property, either real or personal, because of
its ownership, is a direct tax. This, however, is clearly to read into
the earlier deeision what is not there. No doubt the definition has
:i certain precision, but whether it is a workable definition is questionable. It is also to be noted that. in Knowlton v. Moore, as well
as in Nicol v. Anies, the court repudiates the economic definition of
a direct tax, and declares somewhat' darkly that in determining the
12 \Vheaton 41g. (1827).
173 u. s. 519-520.
"See 158 U •. S. 635.
zt 178 U. S. 41. (1goo).
11
Cf. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S.

l!

11

us, and Murdock v. \Vard, 178 U. S. 139.
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validity of a tax its actual, practical result!? should be considered
rather than the abstract ideas of theorists. 23
In 1902 the court held that a tax upon manufactured tobacco iii
the hands of a dealer, not the manufacturer, was an excise and not
a direct tax. 21 Justice BREWER said in part: "It is not a tax upon
property as such, but upon certain kinds [italics are mine] of property, having reference to their origin and their intended use." Again
the history of excises was relied upon in support of the result arrived at, but no reasoning was given to show why the tax before
the court was not a tax upon property. The truth is that the argument of counsel that the tax was one upon personal property and,
accordingly, by the Pollock case, a direct tax is logically unaI).swerable, and the.court's only escape from it was to quote definitions of
"excise" which could never have been framed in face of the idea
that a tax on personalty because of ownership is a direct tax.
In Thomas v. United States25 the court passed upon the constitutionality of a stamp tax on sales of certificates of stock which was
imposed by the revenue act of 1898. Here the court was again
brought face to face with the propositions, advanced ·by the attorneys, that (I) "the right of sale and transfer is an inherent attribute of property," and (2) "a tax upon the sale of articles is in
substance a tax upon the articles themselves." This was a· clear
-case of a tax on sales. The court, however, denied that it was a tax
on sales and asserted that it was a privilege tax and therefore indirect, on the ground that the sale of stocks was but a particular
business transaction in the exercise of the privilege enjoyed by corporations which are permitted to dispose of property in the form of
·certificates. The court said the words duties, imposts and excises
''were used comprehensively to cover customs and excise duties .
imposed on importation, consumption, manufacture and sale of
certain commodities, privileges, particular business transactions,
vocations, occupations and the like." We thus obtain a form of
definition for '"indirect" tax, but its lack of harmony with the logic
of the court's view of ·"direct" tax is palpable. Just as in Patton v.
Brady, the court was willing to except "certain commodities" from
the rule in the Income Tax- case and thereby to emasculate the
whole proposition.
In short, in the cases just reviewed, there is a clear inconsistency
<>n the part of the court in trying to justify on historical ground,
as indirect, taxes which by the definition avowed by it were direct.
•In this case it was also decided that uniformity, in the aense of the Constitu·
tion, meant simply geographical uniformity.
"Patton v. ;Brady. 184 U. S. 6o8. (1902).
• lga U. S.·363. .(1904}.
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The Pollock case rejected the historical view. Later courts have
tried to straddle the two positions but they will not drive together.
The same revenue act of I898 imposed a tax upon the gross
annual receipts, in excess of $250,000, of any corporation or company carrying on or doing the business of refining sugar. The court
held this to be a tax on the business of refining sugar ~nd not on
property. 26 It was, therefore, an excise and not repugnant to the
Constitution. Again we perceive the practical effort of the court
directed to sustaining the tax before it, matched, however, by a
curious tenacity in adhering to an unworkable doctrine. 27
The Corporation Income Ta~ case has much significance in the
development of the theory of a direct tax, and shows once more
the court's extreme hesitancy in qeclaring a tax to be a tax upon
property. 28 The court here, just as in Knowlton v. ltfoore, interpreted the Pollock case as standing for the principle that a tax imposed upon property simply because of ownership is a direct tax.
Nevertheless the jncome tax upon the doing of. business under corporate organization was held to be "an excise upon the particular
privilege of doing business in a corporate capacity." The tax is
not payable, the court continued, unless business is Ca.rried on in
the designated capacity. True, the tax was in form an income taf{,
but this was because the income was the measure of the privileg~:
Nor was it a valid objection that the measure included, "in part at
least, property which as such could not be directly taxed." Using
this same . reasoning why could not a tax on the incomes of individuals::-be. called a tax on tfie privilege of doing business-the
business .. of investing funds, of· renting real estate,-in short, of
using property to produce income? The distinction is a narrow one
at least. 29
., Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397. (1904).
"1 In South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, (1905), a federal revenue
officer had collected a certain sum from a state dispenser of liquors under the federal
internal revenue laws. The court held that the ta."'< was not imposed upon any property
belonging to the state, but was. a charge on a business before any profits were realized
therefrom.
:s Flint v. Stone Tracy Co .. 220 U. S. 107. (19n).
"On the basis of this decision Mr. Underwood strongly supported an excise-tax
bill in the House in 1912, which purported to extend to perso.ns a tax similar to the
one on incomes of corporations. It was purely an income tax as proposed. but Mr.
Underwood sought to evade the decision in the Pollock case by calling it a tax on th~
carrying on of business and then proposed to measure the business, and hence the
tax, by the amount of income from all sources. The term "business., was to be given
a wide scope; for instance one who owns a house and rents it is in the business of
renting real estate.
It would be interesting to know just how the court would have treated such a
tax. It probably would have said that individuals had no privilege of doing business
in a particular way as corl?orations had. Co1,g. Record, 62 Cong., :znd sess. pp.
3497-3526.
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THE BRUSHABER CASE AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT.

The Constitution recognizes but two classes of taxes, namely:
(I) direct taxes, which should be levied according to the rule of
apportionment; and ( 2) duties, imposts and excises, which should
be levied according to the rule of uniformity. During the whole
history of taxation the Supreme Court has never recognized any tax
as falling intermediately between these two classes and i:qcluded by
neither. It had come to be recognized that all taxes fell within one
of these two classes. \Vbcn the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted
which provided that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or
enumeration," the general opinion was that the amendment took
this particular direct tax and relieved it of the.necessity of being
apportioned, thereby ci;eating an exception to the constitutional rule
that all direct taxes should be apportioned. However, when the
amendment came up for interpretation in Brushaber v. Union
Pacific Railroad Conipany, 30 the court realized that if this interpretation were given there would be no constitutional limitations ·or restrictions whatever on the power to lay and collect income taxes,
because they would be relieved of the rule of apportionment and at
the same time would not come under the rule of uniformity. To
the cottrt this was· undesirable and, therefore, tlieir interpretation
of the Sixteenth Amendment required a new interpretation of the
opinion set forthin the Pollock case.
Chief Justice WHITE in the opinion said that "the conclusion
reached in the Pollock case did not in any degree involve holding
that 'income taxes generically and necessarily came within the class
of direct taxes on property, but, on the contrary; recognized the
fact that taxc.tion on income was in its nature an excise entitled to
be enforced as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce
it would amount to accomplishing the result which the requir~nient
as to apportionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent, in
which ·case the duty would arise to disregard form and consider
substance alone, and hence subject· the tax to the regulation as
to apportionment which otherwise as an excis~ would not apply
to it." 31 In other words the court clearly exceeded its power by
declaring a tax: to be a direct tax, which, in fact, was not a direct
tax, merely because its enforcement would have the same effect as
an unapportioned direct tax. To express it in still another form,
.. 240 U. S. l. (1916).
240
16-17.

ai

u. s.
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the constitutional fathers had in mind certain possible abuses of the
taxing power and in order to remedy them they stipulated that all
direct ta_xes should be apportioned. Then there arose a tax which
was not a direct tax but which had the same possibilities of abuse
that the fathers intended to remedy by the direct tax clause. Therefore, the court deemed it its dtlty. to call such a tax a direct tax.
The court deliberately broke the letter of the law· in order to keep_
Congress. from doing what the court'- thought the framers of the
Constitution did not wish Congress to do. The Constitution was
found wanting and the court supplied the deficiency.
We wish, howe\rer, to disagree emphatically with the Chief Jus-·
tice, .because· we do not see ,how any fair and reasonable interpretation of the opinion in the Pollock case would warrant such a conclusion. 'When the court said that a tax on the income from real
estate ~'fell within the same class as the source whence the income
was derived, that is, that a tax upon the realty and a tax upon the
receipts therefrom were alike direct,'' and again: "Admitting that
this act taxes the income of property irrespective of its source, still
we cannot doubt that such a tax is necessarily a direct tax in the
meaning of the Constitution," it clearly meant that a tax on income
from property was a direct tax, and no explanation can make it
appear otheqvise. It is true, the anticipated ·effect of the income
tax may have greatly influenced the court in formulating their
opinion but that this was the basis of the decision cannot be gained
from the opinion itself. There ,was, however, no inconsistency on
the part of Chief Justice WHITE as he held a very similar view of
the opinion in the Pollock case at the time it was given. ·This may
be seen in the dissenting opinion of Justice WHITE 'with which Justice HARLAN concurred.32 The Brieshaber case clearly shows, there-

.

'

="The right to tax, and not the effects which may follow from its lawful exercise,
is the only judicial question which this court is called upon to consider. If an indirect tax, which the Constitution has not ,subjected to the rule of apportionment, is
to be held to be a direct tax, because it ,will bear upon aggregations of property in
different sections· of the country, according to the extent of such aggregations, then
the power is denied to Congress to .do that which the Constitution authorizes, because
the exercise of a lawful power is supposed to work out a result which, in the opini<>n
of the court, was not contemplated by the fathers. If this be sound, then every nues·
tion which has been determined in our past history is now still open for judicial re·
consh-uction.'' 157 U. S. 643.
·
·
In this connection it is interesting to note that Justice Patterson in his opinion
in the Hylton case said that the direct tax clause of the Constitution wa~ made in favor
of the South em States, which had many· slaves and extensive tracts of territory, thinly
settled and not very productive; while the other states had bt1t Jew slaves and several
-of them a limited territory, well settled and highly cultivated. "Congress in such case,
might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily, and land· in ·every part of the Union after
the same rate or measure; so much a head in the first instance, and so much an acre
ln the second."
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fore that the court has forsaken the decision in the Pollock case
and has accepted the view of Justice WHITE as expressed in his dis'senting opinion.
Having given this interpretation of the Pollock case the Chief
Justice proceeded in the Brushaber case to interpret the Sixteenth
Amendment, which, he maintained, did not create a new kind of
tax. The whole purpose of the amendment was to relieve all income taxes, when imposed, from the necessity of being apportioned
because of consideration of the source whence the income was derived. It intended to do away with "the principle upon which the
Pollock case was decided, that is, of determining whether a tax on
income was direct * * * by taking into view the burden which
resulted on the property from which the income was derived." Its
aim was "the prevention of the resort to the sources from which a
taxed income was derived in order to cause a direct tax on the income to be a direct tax on the source itself, and thereby to take an
income tax out of the class of excises, duties, and imposts, and place
it in the class of direct taxes." This positiqn followed logically the
interpretation given to the Pollock case and the excuse for it .all is
that it brough~ the income tax under the rule of uniformity.
The C~ief .Tustice maintained. that from the time of the Hylton
case "it had c0me to be accepted that direct taxes in the cc,mstitutional sense were· confined to taxes levied directly on real estate
because of its ownershfp." He also asserted that this same view of
the earlier cases was held in the Pollock case. The fact is, however, that the phrase "because of ownersMp" is a recent development in .connection with the direct tax discussion and that the use
of it in connection with those earlier cases is reading into them
something that is not there.
The Brushaber case was followed by Stanton v. Baltic Mining
Conipany, 33 where the income tax law was attacked on the ground
that a tax on the product of a mine was a direct tax on property
because of its ownership unless adequate allowance was made for
the exhaustion of the ore body as a result of working the mine. The
company averred that it was taxed one per cent upon its gross receipts during the year 1914 after deducting, (I) operating and
maintenance expenses, and ( 2) losses including depreciation arising
from depletion of its ore deposits to the limited extent of five per
cent of the "gross value at the mine of the output" during the year.
The ·contention was that the five per cent deduction was an madequate allowance for the depletion of the ore body and therefore the
law taxed not the mere profit arisi~g: from the operation of the mine
30240

u. s.

103-

(1916).
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but also a portion of their principal or capital. The court largely
evaded the issue as to whether such a tax was really an income tax
and merely asserted that the rule established by the Sixteenth
Amendment eovered the case. Not quite satisfied with this explanation, however, the court, in order to show that the tax was
not a direct tax on property because of ownership, relied upon the
decision in Stratton's Independence v. Howbert 3' which, aside from
the Sixteenth Amendment, affirmed that such a tax was not a tax
upon property as such because of its ownership, but a true excise
levied on the results of carrying on mining operations.
SUMMARY.

The definition of a direct tax before 1895 was a tax directly imposed OJ:?. real estate and invariably such impositions as income
taxes, inheritance taxes, and taxes on bank notes were held not to
be direct taxes. Since the Pollock case, moreover, we see an evident desire on the part of the court to uphold the hands of Congress in regard to the taxing power, with the result that no tax
levied by Congress since that date has, as l:iefor~, been held to be
an unapportioned direct tax.
In the Pollock case, which stands out accordingly as a unique
product of judicial solicitude for the salvation of society against
itself, the bugaboo .of socialism set forth by the attorneys for the
complainant caused the court to declare·-a tax on income from property, real or personal, to be a direct tax. From this case has developed the present view of the court as to a 4irect tax \vhich is substantially as follows : any tax on property, real or personal, because
of its ownership is a direct tax. In every decision, however, since
the Pollock case the tax has been held to be not upon property be·
cause of its ownership, but upon the peculiar right, privilege, or
facility enjoyed or used, or upon the business involved, and valid
as an excise.
This definition of a direct tax is vague and unsatisfactory. What
test will the court apply to determine whether a tax is on property
because of ownership? None has been developed so far and in
each ne\v case that comes up the court gropes around for somt:
pro hac 11ice basis for a decision. Will the Bruslzabcr case be interpreted as overthrowing the doctrine that a tax on an inherent right
of ownership is a direct tax upon the property owned? !£ so the
implied view of the court in Nicol v. Ames, that a tax on sc.les in
general is a direct tax on property, would not now hold. It may
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be that the court, on the basis of the Brushaber case, will finally
go back to the definition of "direct" tax which was held before the
Pollock case. There· is but one step· more to take. However, the
situation at present is this,-when the court wants to uphold a tax
law of Congress it merely says the tax is not one on property because of ownership. On the other hand,_ in many instances, if the
court should think a particular tax undesirable it could just as
readilv evoke a revelation from its inner consciousness that the tax
.was 6~e on property because of ownership.
J. H. RIDDLE:
Princeton Uni·versity.

